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Cooperation plays a key role in the evolution of complex systems. However, the 
level of cooperation extensively varies with the topology of agent networks in the 
widely used models of repeated games. Here we show that cooperation remains 
rather stable by applying the reinforcement learning strategy adoption rule, Q-
learning on a variety of random, regular, small-word, scale-free and modular 
network models in repeated, multi-agent Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk-Dove 
games. Furthermore, we found that using the above model systems other long-term 
learning strategy adoption rules also promote cooperation, while introducing a low 
level of noise (as a model of innovation) to the strategy adoption rules makes the 
level of cooperation less dependent on the actual network topology. Our results 
demonstrate that long-term learning and random elements in the strategy 
adoption rules, when acting together, extend the range of network topologies 
enabling the development of cooperation at a wider range of costs and temptations. 
These results suggest that a balanced duo of learning and innovation may help to 
preserve cooperation during the re-organization of real-world networks, and may 
play a prominent role in the evolution of self-organizing, complex systems. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Cooperation is necessary for the emergence of complex, hierarchical systems [1–5]. 
Why is cooperation maintained, when there is a conflict between self-interest and the 
common good? A set of answers emphasized agent similarity, in terms of kin- or group-
selection and compact network communities, which is helped by learning of successful 
strategies [2,3]. On the other hand, agent diversity in terms of noise, variation of 
behavior and innovation, as well as the changing environment of the agent-community 
all promoted cooperation in different games and settings [3,6–8].  
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Small-world, scale-free or modular network models, which all give a chance to develop 
the complexity of similar, yet diverse agent-neighborhoods, provide a good starting 
point for the modeling of the complexity of cooperative behavior in real-world networks 
[9–13]. However, the actual level of cooperation in various games, such as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games is very sensitive to the topology of the agent 
network model [14–16, Electronic supplementary material 1 – ESM1 – Table S1.1]. In 
our work we applied a set of widely used network models and examined the stability of 
cooperation after repeated games using the reinforcement learning strategy adoption 
rule, Q-learning. To examine the surprising stability of cooperation observed, when 
using Q-learning, we approximated the complex rules of Q-learning by designing a 
long-term versions of the best-takes-over and other strategy adoption rules as well as 
introducing a low level of randomness to these rules. We found that none of these 
features alone results in a similar stability of cooperation in various network models. 
However, when applied together, long-term (‘learning’) and random (‘innovative’) 
elements of strategy adoption rules can make cooperation relatively stable under various 
conditions in a large number of network models. Our results have a wide application in 
various complex systems of biology from the cellular level to social networks and 
ecosystems.  
 
 
Results 
 
Sensitivity of cooperation on network topology 
As an illustrative example for the sensitivity of cooperation on network topology, we 
show cooperating agents after the last round of a ‘repeated canonical Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game’ (PD-game) on two, almost identical versions of a modified Watts-
Strogatz-type small-world model network [13,17]. Comparison of the top panels of 
Figure 1 shows that a minor change of network topology (replacement of 37 links from 
900 links total) completely changed both the level and topology of cooperating agents 
playing with a best-takes-over short term strategy adoption rule. We have observed a 
similar topological sensitivity of cooperation in all combinations of (a) other short-term 
strategy adoption rules; (b) a large number of other network topologies; (c) other games, 
such as the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.1 
and S1.6). 
 
Q-learning stabilizes cooperation in different network topologies 
On the contrary to the general sensitivity of cooperation to the topology of agent-
networks in PD-games using the short-term strategy adoption rule shown above, when 
the long-term, reinforcement learning strategy adoption rule, Q-learning was applied, 
the level and configuration of cooperating agents showed a surprising stability (cf. the 
bottom panels of Figure 1). Just oppositely to the short-term strategy adoption rule 
shown on the top panels of Figure 1, the Q-learning strategy adoption rule (a) is based 
on the long-term experiences of the agents from all previous rounds allowing some 
agents to choose a cooperative strategy despite of the current adverse effects, and (b) is 
an ‘innovative’ strategy adoption rule [3] re-introducing cooperation even under 
conditions, when it has already been wiped out from the network-community 
completely [18,19]. 
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Extending the observations shown on Figure 1 we decided to compare the level of 
cooperation in PD-games on small-world and scale-free networks at various levels of 
temptations (T, the defector’s payoff, when it meets a cooperator) in detail. The top 
panel of Figure 2 shows that the cooperation level of agents using the best-takes-over 
strategy adoption rule rapidly decreased with a gradual increase of their temptation to 
defect. This was generally true for both small-world, and scale-free networks leaving a 
negligible amount of cooperation at T-values higher than 4.5. However, at smaller 
temptation levels the level of cooperation greatly differed in the two network topologies. 
Initially, the small-world network was preferred, while at temptation values higher than 
3.7, agents of the scale-free network developed a larger cooperation. The behavior of 
agents using the Q-learning strategy adoption rule was remarkably different (top panel 
of Figure 2). Their cooperation level remained relatively stable even at extremely large 
temptation values. Moreover, the cooperation levels of agents using Q-learning had no 
significant difference, if we compared small-world and scale-free networks. This 
behavior continued at temptation values higher than 6 (data not shown). We have 
observed the same differences in both the extent of cooperation at extremely high 
temptations (or gains of hawks meeting a dove in the Hawk-Dove game) and the 
topological sensitivity of cooperation in all combinations of (a) other short-term strategy 
adoption rules; (b) a large number of other network topologies; (c) other games, such as 
the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.2 and S1.6). 
 
Long-term strategy adoption rules improve but do not stabilize cooperation in 
different networks 
Next we wanted to see, if other long-term strategies besides Q-learning can also 
promote cooperation between agents. In Q-learning agents consider a long-term 
experience learned in all the past rounds of the play. Therefore, we modified the best-
takes-over strategy adoption rule allowing the agents to use accumulative rewards of 
their neighbors in all past rounds instead of the reward received just in the last round. In 
agreement with our expectations, both on small-world and scale-free networks this 
long-term strategy adoption rule outperformed its short-term version allowing a larger 
number of agents to cooperate – especially at high temptation values. Importantly, the 
differences between cooperation levels observed in small-world and scale-free networks 
were even greater, when we applied the long-term strategy adoption rule compared to its 
short-term version (middle panel of Figure 2). We have received very similar results in 
all combinations of (a) other short- and long-term strategy adoption rule pairs; (b) a 
large number of other network topologies; (c) other games, such as the extended 
Prisoner’s Dilemma or Hawk-Dove games. Long-term learning strategy adoption rules 
also promoted cooperation (albeit at lower efficiency than in case of complex network 
structures), when we used networks re-randomized after each play, or randomly picked 
agents (ESM1 Figures S1.3–S1.6). As a summary, we conclude that long-term strategy 
adoption rules (‘learning’ instead of simple imitation) allow a larger cooperation, but do 
not stabilize the cooperation-fluctuations inflicted by the different topologies of the 
underlying networks, which leaves the remarkable topological stability of the Q-
learning strategy adoption rule still unexplained. 
 
Low level of randomness of the strategy adoption rules is needed to stabilize 
cooperation level in different network topologies 
Next we tested, if the innovative elements of the Q-learning strategy adoption rule may 
contribute to the stability of cooperation in various network topologies. For this, we 
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constructed an ‘innovative’ version of the long-term version of the best-takes-over, 
‘non-innovative’ strategy adoption rule by adding a low level of randomness instructing 
agents to follow the opposite of the selected neighbor’s strategy with a pre-set Pinnovation 
probability (see Methods). Cooperation levels achieved by the innovative long-term 
best-takes-over strategy adoption rule are shown on the bottom panel of Figure 2. At 
temptation values smaller than T=3.8 the innovative long-term version of the best-takes 
over strategy adoption rule outperformed Q-learning, which resulted in a larger 
proportion of cooperating agents (cf. top and bottom panels of Figure 2). However, at 
high temptation values Q-learning proved to be more efficient in maintaining 
cooperation. Most importantly, cooperation levels in small-world and scale-free 
networks were much closer to each other, when using the long-term innovative strategy-
adoption rule, than either the ‘only long-term’, or short-term versions of the same 
strategy adoption rule (Figure 2). At high temptation values cooperation levels of long-
term innovative strategy adoption rules on small-world and scale-free networks were 
converging to each other and even to the cooperation level observed, when using the Q-
learning strategy adoption rule. We have received very similar results in combinations 
of (a) other innovative short- and long-term strategy adoption rules; (b) a large number 
of other network topologies; (c) other games, such as the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma 
or Hawk-Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.7 and S1.8). According to the expectations [8], 
the stabilizing role of the randomness in the strategy adoption rules depended on the 
actual value of the pre-set Pinnovation probability, and showed an optimum at intermediary 
Pinnovation levels, where the actual value of optimal Pinnovation depended on the strategy 
adoption rule and network topology. The effect of changes in Pinnovation was much more 
pronounced in case of scale-free networks than at small-world networks, which is a 
rather plausible outcome, since the larger irregularity of scale-free networks makes the 
re-introduction of extinct strategies a lot more crucial (ESM1 Figure S1.8). 
 
We have shown so far that long-term, learning strategy adoption rules help the 
development of cooperation, while ‘innovative’ strategy adoption rules make the 
cooperation level more independent from the actual network topology. Figure 3 
illustrates how the cooperative network topologies were expanded, when we used long-
term learning and ‘innovative’ versions of the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule as 
well as Q-learning at a high level of temptation, which made cooperation especially 
difficult. The application of the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule resulted in non-
zero cooperation only sporadically. Cooperation levels using the long-term best-takes-
over strategy adoption rule varied greatly, and still had several network configurations 
with zero cooperation. On the contrary, the two ‘innovative’ long-term learning strategy 
adoption rules had a much higher than zero cooperation in almost all networks tested, 
and the cooperation level remained fairly stable using a great variety of network 
topologies. This was especially true for Q-learning, which gave a stable level of 
cooperation even at regular networks (Figure 3), which result in a high instability of 
cooperation (see ESM1 Table S1.1). We have received very similar results in extended 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk-Dove games (ESM1 Figures S1.9 and S1.10). 
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Discussion 
 
As a summary, our simulations showed that long-term learning strategy adoption rules 
promote cooperation, while innovative elements make the appearance of cooperation 
less dependent from the actual network topology in two different games using a large 
number of network topologies in model networks. We must emphasize that the term 
‘learning’ is used in our paper in the sense of the collection and use of information 
enriching and diversifying game strategy and behavior, and not in the restricted sense of 
imitation, or directed information-flow from a dominant source (the teacher) 
pauperizing the diversity of game strategies. The help of learning in promoting 
cooperation is already implicitly involved in the folk theorem, which opens the 
theoretical possibility for the emergence of cooperation at infinitely repeated games 
[3,20]. Learning, communication, negotiation, reputation-building mechanisms have all 
been shown to promote cooperation in various simulations as well as in games with 
groups of a variety of living organisms, including animals and humans (ESM1 Table 
S1.2). With the current work we have extended these findings showing that agents can 
markedly improve their cooperation, when they are allowed to consider long-term 
experiences either of their own (Q-learning) or their neighbors (other long-term 
strategies used), and this ‘shadow of the past’ [21] acts similarly at a great variety of 
network topologies.  
 
We use the term ‘innovation’ in the sense of irregularities in the selection of adoption 
rules of game strategy. Therefore, ‘innovation’ may be caused by errors, mutations, 
mistakes, noise, randomness and temperature besides the bona fide innovation of 
conscious, intelligent agents. Our term, ‘innovation’ allows the change of the strategy 
adoption rules, therefore allows (increases) the evolvability [22] of our model system. 
Innovative strategies help to avoid ‘herding’, when agents start to use a uniform strategy 
and behavior forming synchronous clusters (ESM1 Figures S1.11, S1.12 and data not 
shown). Innovation increases game diversity and complexity, which, similarly to the 
stabilizing effect of weak links in a large variety of static networks, may significantly 
stabilize network dynamics (probably by helping the convergence of possible outcomes; 
[23]). Irregularities in network topology, noise, stochastic resonance, stochastic 
focusing and innovative strategies were shown to promote cooperation in various 
simulations as well as in games of primates and humans (ESM1 Table S1.3). However, 
the innovation-driven relative stabilization of cooperation in various network topologies 
is a novel finding reported here. 
 
Cooperation helps the development of complex network structures [4,5,24]. Network 
dynamics and evolution lead to a large variety of link re-arrangements [25,26]. Network 
evolution is full of stochastic ‘errors’, and often results in the development of a higher 
average degree [25], which makes cooperation more difficult [15,16]. The highly 
similar cooperation levels of scale-free networks with different average degrees and of 
many other network topologies of model networks (Figure 3, ESM1 Figures S1.9 and 
S1.10) show that innovative long-term learning strategy adoption rules may provide a 
buffering safety-net to avoid the deleterious consequences of possible overshoots and 
errors in network development on cooperation. Our simulations showed (Figure 2, 
ESM1 Figures S1.2 and S1.6) that the help of innovative long-term learning is 
especially pronounced at conditions, where the relative cost of cooperation is the 
highest making cooperation most sensitive to the anomalies of network evolution [15]. 
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This extreme situation is more easily reached, when the whole system becomes 
resource-poor, which makes all relative costs higher. Resource-poor networks develop a 
set of topological phase transitions in the direction of random Æ scale-free Æ star Æ 
fully connected subgraph topologies [27]. This further substantiates the importance of 
our findings that long-term, innovative learning allows a larger ‘cooperation-
compatible’ window of these topologies, thus helps to avoid the decomposition of 
network structure in case of decreasing system resources due to e.g. an environmental 
stress. Further work is needed to show the validity of our findings in real-world 
networks as well as in combination with network evolution. 
 
Our current work can be extended in a number of ways. The complexity of the game-
sets and network topologies offers a great opportunity for a detailed equilibrium-
analysis, similarly to that described by Goyal and Vega-Redondo [28]. The cited study 
[28] allows a choice of the interacting partners (an option denied in our model), which 
leads to another rich field of possible extensions, where the network topology is 
changing (evolving) during the games such as in the paper of Holme and Ghoshal [29]. 
Similarly, a detailed analysis of link rearrangement-induced perturbations, avalanches 
like in the paper of Ebel and Bornholdt [30] as well as exploration of a number of other 
topological re-arrangements would also significantly extend the current results. Such 
topology-changes may include 
• hub-rewiring including the formation and resolution of ‘rich-clubs’, where hub-hub 
contacts are preferentially formed [31,32]; 
• emergence of modularity beyond to our data in ESM1 Figure S1.4; 
• appearance and disappearance of bridge-elements between modules; 
• changes of modular overlaps and module hierarchy, etc. 
 
Tan [33] showed that cooperation helps faster learning. This, when combined with our 
current findings may lead to a self-amplifying cycle between cooperation and learning, 
where cooperation-induced learning promotes cooperation. Emerging cooperation 
alleviates a major obstacle to reach a higher level of network hierarchy and complexity 
[4]. In social networks learning establishes trust, empathy, reputation and embeddedness 
[34–37], and the benefits of learning by multiple generations are exemplified by the 
development of traditions, norms and laws. These give the members of the society 
further reasons for withholding their individual selfishness, thereby reaching a higher 
network complexity and stability. We believe that learning and innovation (in forms of 
repeated, interaction-driven, or random network remodeling steps, respectively or using 
the Baldwin-effect, see ESM1 Discussion) help the evolution of cooperation between 
agents other than human beings or animals, including proteins, cells or ecosystems 
[23,38], and were crucial in the development of multi-level, self-organizing, complex 
systems. 
 
Methods 
 
Games. In both the Hawk-Dove and the Prisoner's Dilemma games, each agent had two choices: to 
cooperate or to defect. In the repeated, multi-agent Hawk-Dove game the benefit of defectors is higher 
than that of cooperators, when they are at low abundance, but falls below cooperator benefit, when 
defectors reach a critical abundance [12,13]. On the contrary, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game defection 
always has a fitness advantage over cooperation. The canonical parameter-set of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game ( 0,1,3 === SPR , the T, temptation value varies between 3 to 6; 3 is not included; where R is 
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the reward for mutual cooperation, P is the punishment for mutual defection, S and T are the payoffs for 
the cooperator and defector, respectively, when meeting each other) restricts cooperation more, than the 
parameter set of the extended (also called as ‘weak’) Prisoner’s Dilemma game ( 0,0,1 === SPR  
with T values ranging from 1 to 2; [11–13]). (When we tried the parameter set of 
 with T values ranging from 1.0 to 2.0, we have received very similar results; 
data not shown.) 
1.0,2.0,1 === SPR
( ) / 2G C−
 
In the Hawk-Dove games (or in the conceptually identical Snowdrift and Chicken games [13,39,40]) each 
agent had two choices: to defect (to be a hawk) or to cooperate (to be a dove). When a hawk met a dove, 
the hawk gained G benefits, whereas the payoff for the dove was zero. Two hawks suffered a 
 cost each upon encounter, where C  was the cost of their fight. When two doves met, 
the benefit for each dove was . If not otherwise stated, the cost of injury (C, when a hawk met a 
hawk) was set to 1. The value of G varied from 0 to 1 with the increments of 0.1. If we want to compare 
the above, usually applied nomenclature of the Hawk-Dove games with that of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games, R=G/2, P=(G-C)/2, S=0 and T=G. 
G>
/ 2G
 
In Hawk-Dove games T>R>S>P, in the extended (also called ‘weak’) Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
T≥R>P≥S, while in the canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game T>R>P>S. This makes the following order of 
games from less to more stringent general conditions allowing less and less cooperation: Hawk-Dove 
game > extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game > canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Due to this general 
order, we showed the results of the canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the main text, and inserted the 
results of the two other games to the Electronic Supplementary Material 1 (ESM1). 
 
In our simulations each node in the network was an agent, and the agent could interact only with its direct 
neighbors. Agents remained at the same position throughout all rounds of the repeated games, and they 
were neither exchanged, nor allowed to migrate. If not otherwise stated, games started with an equal 
number of randomly mixed defectors and cooperators (hawks and doves in the Hawk-Dove game), and 
were run for 5,000 rounds (time steps). The payoff for each agent in each round of play was the average 
of the payoffs it received by playing with all its neighbors in the current round. In our long-term learning 
strategy adoption rules introduced below, the accumulative payoff means the accumulation of the average 
payoffs an agent gets in each round of play. Average payoff smoothes out possible differences in the 
degrees of agents, and in several aspects may simulate real-world situations better than non-averaged 
payoff, since in real-world situations agents usually have to observe a cost of maintaining a contact with 
their neighbors [39–41]. Moreover, average payoff helps the convergence of cooperation levels as the 
rounds of the game (time steps) proceed, what we indeed observed in most of the cases (with a few 
exceptions noted in the text), and helps to avoid ‘late-conversions’ occurring mostly in scale-free 
networks after 10,000 or more time steps using non-averaged payoffs. With this method it was enough to 
calculate the proportion of cooperators as the average ratio of cooperators of the last 10 rounds of the 
game (if not otherwise stated) for 100 independent runs. 
 
Strategy adoption rules. In Prisoner’s Dilemma and Hawk-Dove games our agents followed three 
imitation-type, short-term strategy adoption rules, the ‘pair-wise comparison dynamics’ (also called as 
‘replicator dynamics’), ‘proportional updating’ and ‘best-takes-over’ (also called as ‘imitation of the best’) 
strategy adoption rules [13]. We call these rules strategy adoption rules and not evolution rules to avoid 
the mis-interpretation of our games as cellular automata-type games, where agents are replaced time-to-
time. In our games no replacement took place, therefore these games were not evolutionary games in this 
strict sense. All strategy adoption rules had synchronous update, meaning that in each round of play the 
update took place after each agent had played with all their neighbors. To avoid the expansion of 
parameters with the differential placements of various agents in complex network structures all agents 
used the same strategy adoption rule in the agent-network. In the three strategy adoption rules we applied 
initially (‘best-takes-over’, ‘pair-wise comparison dynamics’ and ‘proportional updating’) all agents were 
myopic, and made their decisions based on the average payoffs gained in the previous round.  
 
Pair-wise comparison dynamics strategy adoption rule. In the ‘pair-wise comparison dynamics’ 
strategy adoption rule [13] for any agent i , a neighboring agent j  was selected randomly, and agent i  
used the strategy of agent j with a probab oility f ip . In our expe nts the probabrime ility was determined as 
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0
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−⎧
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i i j
G
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Proportional updating strategy adoption rule. For the ‘proportional updating’ str
the current round of 
ategy adoption rule 
3] agen and all its neighbors competed for the strategy of agen with the probabilityt i  t i  ip[1 , which was 
determined as  ( ){ }, ,ii
n
G
n
p i n N i i
G
= ∈ ∪∑  where ( )N i  was the neighborh d of agent 
i and iG  was the in the cu d of play. Since p is a probability, 
i
r an ent is always greater than or equal to zero, there was no need to increase the value of iG . 
Best-takes-over strategy adoption rule. In the ‘best-takes-over’ strategy adoption rule (als
oo
average payoff received by agent 
d to each to avoid negative value . For Prisoner’s Dilemma games, because the reward 
 
o called as 
itation of the best strategy adoption rule, [13]) agen adopted the strategy of that agent selected from 
Q
l discounted expected 
i  
s
rrent roun
C
fo
 was a
 ag
dde G  
im t i  
i  and its neighbors, who had the highest average payoff in the last round of play. 
 
-learning strategy adoption rule. As a reinforcement learning [19] strategy adoption rule, we used Q-
arning [18], where agents learned an optimal strategy maximizing their totale
reward in the repeated game. In Q-learning we assumed that the environment constituted a discrete 
Markov process with finite states. An agent chose action ta  from a finite collection of actions at time 
step, t . The state of the environment changed from state s to 1tst + after the action of the agent, and the 
agent received the reward tr at the same time. The probabili  of state transition from ts  to 1ts + when the 
agent hose action ta  was 
[
ty
c
] [ ]1 1t t t t t t| , , ,prob s s s a P s a s+ += = . 
The task of the agen was tot  learn the optimal strategy to maximize the total discounted expected reward. 
The discounted reward meant that the rewards received by the agent in e future were worth less than  th
that received in the current round. Under a policyπ  denoting how the agent selected the action at its 
actual state and reward, the value of state, ts was 
( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( ), ,t t t t t tV s R s P s a s V sπ ππ γ= +
1
1 1
ts S+
+ +
∈
∑ , 
( )( )tR sπ  is the expected reward of state  under policyts  π  and γ ( 0 1γ< <where ) is the discount 
factor. 
ory of Dynamic Programming [19] guarantees that there is at least one optimal stationary policy, 
 
The the
*π , which can be written as 
( ) ( )* *tV s V ( )( ) [ ] ( )
1
*
1 1max , ,
t
t
t t t t t ta A s S
s R s P s a s V sπ ππ γ
+
+ +∈ ∈
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= = +⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑ . 
The task of Q-learning was to learn the optimal policy, π , when the initial conditions of b  the reward 
function and transition probabilities were unknown. If the environment model (reward model and 
o
oth
transition probabilities of states) is known, then the ab ve problem can be solved by using Dynamic 
Programming. Watkins and Dayan [18] introduced Q-learning as incremental Dynamic Programming. 
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The idea of Q-learning is to optimize a Q-function, which can be calculated iteratively without the 
estimate of environment model. For this having a policy, π , we defined the Q-value as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
'
' ', , ,Q s a R s P s a s V sππ γ ⎡ ⎤= + ⎣ ⎦
s S∈
∑ . 
Q-learning consisted of a sequence of distinct stages pisodes. The Q value of state-action pair or e
( , )t ts a  can be learned through the following iterative method: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t tr V sγ+1, 1 ,t t t t t t t tQ s a Q s aα α−= − + 1 1− +⎡ ⎤⎦ , ⎣
( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 1max ,t t t ta AV s Q s a− + − +∈=  and tαwhere controls the
wa
ent. 
 learning and convergence speed of Q-
.  
 multi-agent games, the state of each agent s affected by the states of its direct neighbors. 
hose neighbors constituted the environment of the ag The reward of the agen after taking action 
learning
 
In repeated
T t i  
( )ta i  was defined as:  
( ) ( )i ( )
( )
1 T
t t t
j N ii
r i S MS j
k ∈
= ∑ , 
where M  
 the
was the payoff matrix was a column vector indicating the state of agent  at round , ( )tS i  
f agen
i t , 
ik  was  number of neighbors o t i  and ( )N i  was the set contains all the direct eighbors f 
nt i . The values of elements of 
n o
age ( )tS i  we r 1 and 1 indicated that agent i  was in the 
corresp nding state. In such a repeated i-agent game, Q-learning meant that each a ent tried to 
optimi  its total discounted expecte ard in the repeated game. The optimal strategy was 
approximated by an iterative annealing process. For this for each agent, the selection probability 
(Boltzmann-probability) of action ia  at time step t  was defined as 
( )
re 0 o
o
ze
 mu
re
lt
 w
g
d
( )
( )
, /t iQ s a Teprob a = , , /t k
k
i a T
a A∈
∑
where was the annealing temperature. In our experim nts we selected the discount factor
Q se
eT  , 0.5tγ =
peration.
a games
, 
since in e initial experiments we found that this value is helpful to achieve high levels of coo  
The init l annealing temperature was set to 100 in Hawk-Dove and extended Prisoner’s Dilemm , 
while it was raised to 10,000 in canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games to extend the annealing process [42]. 
In all cases the annealing temperature was decreased gradually by being divided by t  in each round of the 
game till it reached a low bound of 0.001. In order to control the convergence speed of Q-learning, 
1/(1 ( , ))TimesVisited s a
 th
ia
α = +  where ( , )TimesVisited s a  was the number of times that the state-
act at time sti r ( , )s a  had been visited on pai ep t . In this way α  decreased gradually with the time. 
 
Long-term ing and innovative strategy adoption rul . Long-term learning strategy adoplearn es tion 
les were generated by considering the accumulativ payoffs instead of instantaneous average 
 to simulate e 
omplexity of real-world situations. Generation of the Watts-Strogatz-type small-world model network 
[17] was modified according to Tomassini et al. [13] to avoid the heterogeneity in node degrees, which 
ru e average 
rewards in the update progress during each round of play for all strategy adoption rules used. In both short 
term and long-term innovative strategy adoption rules, agent  i   used the opposite strategy of the selected 
neighbor (for proportional updating and best-takes-over strategy adoption rules, the neighborhood 
included agent  i   itself) in the last round of play with probability of innovationP , which was 0.0001 in case 
of Hawk-Dove and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games, while 0.0002 in case of canonical Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games, if not otherwise stated (like in the legend of ESM1 .8). In innovative strategy 
adoption rules agent i  adopted the strategy of the selected neighbor with a probability of 1 innovationP− . 
 
Network construction. In our work we used a set of widely adopted model networks  th
Figure S1
c
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arose during the Watts-Strogatz-type rewiring process changing the regular lattice to a small-world 
network. Such heterogeneity was shown to have a rather big influence on the level of cooperation [13,43]. 
At the generation of the Barabasi-Albert-type scale-free network [44], we started from an initial fully 
connected graph of ‘m’ nodes (where ‘m’ ranged from 1 to 7), and added the new nodes with ‘m’ novel 
links as specified at the individual Figure legends. In the modular networks described by Girvan and 
Newman [45] each network had a scale-free degree distribution, contained 128 nodes, and was divided 
into 4 communities. The average degree was 16. Modularity (community structure) was gradually 
decreased at ‘levels’ 1, 5, 10 and 16, where ‘level 1’ meant that for each node in the network, the 
expected number of links between a node and the nodes which were in other communities was 1 (e.g. low 
compared to the average degree of 16). With increasing ‘level’ the community structure gradually 
decreased. 
 
Network visualization. At the visualization the coordinates of the small-world networks with a rewiring 
probability of p=0.01 were used for the p=0.04 networks to avoid the individual variations of the Pajek-
gures [46] and to help direct comparison. With 15x15 agents the final representations of cooperators 
 from the EU (FP6-518230), Hungarian 
- K69105), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC-
n National Research Initiative (NKFP-1A/056/2004 and KKK-0015/3.0). 
lnoki, 
fi
showed a moderate variability. This was almost negligible, when 50x50 agents were used (data not 
shown). However, 15x15 agents gave a better visual image than the crowded, bulky 50x50 version. 
Therefore, we opted to include this variant to Figure 1. We have selected those figures from the results of 
15x15 agent games, which best represented the 50x50 versions. 
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Figure 1. A long-term learning adoption rule, Q-learning improves and stabilizes cooperation of 
agents forming various small-world networks in Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
The modified Watts-Strogatz small-world network was built on a 15 x 15 lattice, where each 
node was connected to its eight nearest neighbors. The rewiring probabilities of the links placed 
originally on a regular lattice were 0.01 (left panels) and 0.04 (right panels), respectively. For 
the description of the canonical repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as the best-takes-
over (top panels) and Q-learning (bottom panels) strategy adoption rules see Methods and the 
ESM1. The temptation level, T was 3.6. Networks showing the last round of 5,000 plays were 
visualized using the Kamada-Kawai algorithm of the Pajek program [46]. Dark blue dots and 
diamonds correspond to cooperators and defectors, respectively. The Figure shows that both the 
extent and distribution of cooperators vary, when using the best-takes-over strategy adoption 
rule (see top panels), while they are rather stable with the Q-learning strategy update rule (see 
bottom panels). 
 
 12
 
 
Figure 2. Long-term learning elements of strategy update rules help, while a low level of 
randomness relatively stabilizes cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma games played on various 
networks 
Small-world (SW, filled, red symbols) networks were built as described in the legend of Figure 
1. The Barabasi-Albert-type scale-free networks (SF, open, blue symbols) contained 2,500 
nodes, where at each construction step a new node was added with 3 new links attached to the 
existing nodes. For the description of the canonical repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well 
as that of the best-takes-over (triangles, all panels), the Q-learning (rectangles, top panel) the 
best-takes-over long (circles, middle panel), and the best-takes-over long innovative (crosses, 
Pinnovation = 0.0002, bottom panel) strategy adoption rules, see Methods and the ESM1. For each 
strategy adoption rules and T temptation values 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were 
executed. The figure shows that long-term, ‘learning-type’ elements of strategy update rules 
help cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma games played on various networks. A low level of 
randomness (also called as ‘innovation’ in this paper) brings the level of cooperation closer in 
different network topologies. 
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Figure 3. Long-term learning and innovative elements of strategy adoption rules, when applied 
together allow cooperation in a large number of model networks.  
(Top middle panel) The small-world (spheres) and scale-free (cones) model networks were built 
as described in the legends of Figures 1 and 2. The rewiring probability, p of the links of the 
original regular lattices giving small-world networks was increased from 0 to 1 with 0.05 
increments, the number of edges linking each new node to former nodes in scale-free networks 
was varied from 1 to 7, and the means of shortest path-lengths and clustering coefficients were 
calculated for each network. Cubes and cylinders denote regular (p = 0) and random (p = 1.0) 
extremes of the small-world networks, respectively. For the description of the canonical 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as the best-takes-over (green symbols); long-term 
learning best-takes-over (blue symbols); long-term learning innovative best-takes-over (magenta 
symbols) and Q-learning (red symbols) strategy adoption rules used, see Methods and the 
ESM1. For each network 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed at a fixed T value 
of 3.5. 
(Left and right panels) 2D side views of the 3D top middle panel showing the proportion of 
cooperators as the function of the mean length of shortest paths or the mean clustering 
coefficient, respectively.   
(Bottom middle panel) Color-coded illustration of the various network topologies used on the 
top middle panel. Here the same simulations are shown as on the top middle panel with a 
different color-code emphasizing the different network topologies. The various networks are 
represented by the following colors: regular networks – blue; small-world networks – green; 
scale-free networks – yellow; random networks – red (from the angle of the figure the random 
networks are behind some of the small-world networks and, therefore are highlighted with a red 
arrow to make there identification easier).  
The top middle panel and its side views show that the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule 
(green symbols) at this high temptation level results in a zero (or close-to-zero) cooperation. As 
opposed to this, the long-term best-takes-over strategy adoption rule (blue symbols) raise the 
level of cooperation significantly above zero, but the individual values vary greatly at the 
different network topologies. When the long-term strategy adoption rule is combined with a low 
level of randomness (magenta symbols) the cooperation level stays in most cases uniformly and 
its variation becomes high greatly diminished. Q-learning stabilizes cooperation further even at 
regular networks, which otherwise give an extremely variable outcome. 
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Supplementary Text 
 
Supplementary Results 
 
Similarly to the case shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the best-takes-over strategy adoption rule 
in canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games, the three short-term strategy adoption rules (pair-
wise comparison dynamics, proportional updating and best-takes-over) resulted in a rather 
remarkable variation of cooperator levels in Hawk-Dove games when using large number of 
small-world and scale-free model networks (Figures S1.1 and S1.2). For the description of 
game types, strategy adoption rules and model networks see Methods and refs. [1-11].  
 
At Figure S1.1 the m=1 scale-free networks display an irregular ‘phase-transition’-like 
phenomenon, which is most pronounced at the proportional updating strategy adoption rule 
but leads to a faster decay of cooperation at all short-term strategy adoption rules tested. At 
the construction of these m=1 scale-free networks the novel nodes are linked to the existing 
network with a single link only, which results in a tree-like final topology. Due to the 
especially large wiring-irregularity of these networks (as compared to the similarly scale-free, 
but more ‘cross-linked’ networks, where the new nodes are joined with more than one links to 
the existing network) a gradual change in the payoff values makes a more rapid disappearance 
of cooperation. At panel E of Figure S1.1 a non-monotonic behavior of p=0 networks is 
observed. This is derived from the extreme sensitivity of these p=0 regular networks on initial 
conditions, strategy update rules, etc (see references listed in Table S1.1). 
 
Both Q-learning and the long-term versions of all three strategy adoption rules above 
outperformed the short-term variants resulting in a higher proportion of cooperators in Hawk-
Dove games on small-world and scale-free model networks especially at high cooperation 
costs (Figures S1.2A, S1.2B and S1.3). Long-term strategy adoption rules (including Q-
learning) were also more efficient inducers of cooperation even at high costs in modular 
networks (Figure S1.7). Moreover, long-term strategy adaption rules maintained cooperation 
even in randomly mixed populations as well as in repeatedly re-randomized networks (Figure 
S1.5). Interestingly, long-term strategy adoption rules (especially the long-term version of the 
best-takes-over strategy adoption rule) resulted in an extended range of all-cooperator 
outcomes in Hawk-Dove games (Figures S1.3–S1.5 and S1.7). Finally, long-term strategy 
adoption rules helped cooperation in canonical and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games in 
case of all three strategy adoption rules tried (Figure S1.6). 
 
While short- and long-term strategy adoption rules resulted in a remarkable variation of the 
cooperation level in a large variety of random, regular, small-world, scale-free and modular 
networks in Hawk-Dove and both canonical and extended Prisoners’ Dilemma games 
(Figures S1.1–S1.6), Q-learning induced a surprising stability of cooperation levels in all the 
above circumstances (Figures S1.2–S1.6). Interestingly, but expectedly, Q-learning also 
stabilized final cooperation levels, when games were started from a different ratio of 
cooperators (ranging from 10% to 90%) than the usual 50% (data not shown). When we 
introduced innovativity to long-term strategy adoption rules in Hawk-Dove games (for the 
description of these innovative strategy adoption rules see Methods) similarly to that shown 
for the canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game on Figure 2, cooperation levels were closer to 
each other in small-world and scale-free networks than their similarity observed when using 
only long-term, but not innovative strategy adoption rules (Figure S1.7). Importantly, 
innovativity alone, when applied to the best-takes-over short-term strategy adoption rule 
could also stabilize cooperation levels in small-world and scale-free networks (Figure S1.7C). 
When we compared different levels of innovation by changing the value of innovationP  in our 
simulations (Figure S1.8), an intermediary level of innovation was proved to be optimal for 
the stabilization of cooperation in small-world and scale-free networks. Scale-free networks 
and Prisoner’s Dilemma game were more sensitive to higher innovation levels than small-
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world networks or Hawk-Dove games, respectively (Figure S1.8). Summarizing our results, 
Figures S1.9 and S1.10 show that similarly to canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Figure 
3), both in Hawk-Dove games (Figure S1.9) and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Figure 
S1.10) long-term strategy adoption rules and innovation (including Q-learning) resulted in a 
stable non-zero cooperation in a large variety of network topologies in combination only. 
 
Figure S1.11 shows the distribution of hawks (blue dots) and doves (orange dots) at the last 
round of a repeated Q-learning game on small-world (Figure S1.11A and S1.11B) or scale-
free networks (Figure S1.11C and S1.11D) at low (Figure S1.11A and S1.11C) and high 
(Figure S1.11B and S1.11D) relative gain/cost ( G ) values. Under these conditions both 
hawks and doves remained isolated (see arrows). On the contrary, when Hawk-Dove games 
were played with any of the three short-term, non-innovative strategy adoption rules doves, 
but even hawks showed a tendency to form networks (Figure S1.12 and data not shown). This 
effect was especially pronounced for doves in both small-world and scale-free networks, as 
well as for hawks in small-world networks, and present, but not always that strong for hawks 
in scale-free networks, where hawks remained more isolated in all configurations. 
Interestingly, the proportional updating strategy adoption rule quite often showed an extreme 
behavior, when in the last round of the play all agents were either doves or hawks. This 
behavior was less pronounced with a larger number (2,500) of players. All the above findings 
were similarly observed in extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games (data not shown). 
 
Supplementary Discussion 
 
Explaining cooperation has been a perennial challenge in a large section of scientific 
disciplines. The major finding of our work is that learning and innovation extend network 
topologies enabling cooperative behavior in the Hawk-Dove (Figures S1.1–S1.5 and S1.7–
S1.9, S1.11, S1.12) and even in the more stringent Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Figures 1–3, 
S1.6, S1.8 and S1.10). The meaning of ‘learning’ is extended here from the restricted sense of 
imitation or learning from a teacher. Learning is used in this paper to denote all types of 
information collection and processing to influence game strategy and behavior. Therefore, 
learning here includes communication, negotiation, memory and various reputation building 
mechanisms. Learning makes life easier, since instead of the cognitive burden to foresee and 
predict the ‘shadow of the future’ [4–6] learning allows to count on the ‘shadow of the past’, 
the experiences and information obtained on ourselves and/or other agents [12]. Likewise to 
our understanding of learning, the meaning of ‘innovation’ is extended here from the 
restricted sense of innovation by conscious, intelligent agents. Innovation is used in this paper 
to denote all irregularities in the strategy adoption process of the game. Therefore, innovation 
here includes errors, mutations, mistakes, noise, randomness and increased temperature 
besides conscious changes in game strategy adoption rules.  
 
In the Supplementary Discussion, first we summarize the effects of network topology on 
cooperative behavior, then discuss the previous knowledge on the help of cooperation by 
learning and innovation, and, finally, we compare our findings with existing data in the 
literature and show their novelty and implications. 
 
Effect of network topology on cooperation. Cooperation is not an evolutionary stable 
strategy [13], since in the well-mixed case, and even in simple spatial arrangements it is 
outcompeted by defectors. As it is clear from the data summarized in Table S1.1, the 
emergence of cooperation requires an extensive spatial segregation of players helping 
cooperative communities to develop, survive and propagate. Cooperation in repeated multi-
agent games is very senitive to network topology. Cooperation becomes hindered, if the 
network gets over-connected [14–16]. On the contrary, high clustering [17,18], the 
development of fully connected cliques (especially overlapping triangles) and rather isolated 
communities [14,18] usually help cooperation. Heterogeneity of small-worlds and, especially, 
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networks with scale-free degree distribution can establish cooperation even in cases, when the 
costs of cooperation become exceedingly high. 
 
However, in most spatial arrangements cooperation is rather sensitive to the strategy adoption 
rules of the agents, and especially to the strategy adoption rules of those agents, which are 
hubs, or by any other means have an influential position in the network. Moreover, minor 
changes in the average degree, actual degree, shortests paths, clustering coefficients or 
assortativity of network topology may induce a profound change in the cooperation level. 
Since real world networks may have rather abrupt changes in their topologies [17,20–26], it is 
highly important to maintain cooperation during network evolution. 
 
Effect of learning on cooperation. From the data of Table S1.2 it is clear that learning 
generally helps cooperation. Cooperation can already be helped by a repeated play, assuming 
‘learning’ even among spatially disorganized players. Memory-less or low memory strategy 
adoption rules do not promote cooperation efficiently. In contrast, high-memory and complex 
negotiation and reputation-building mechanisms (requiring the learning, conceptualization 
and memory of a whole database of past behaviors, rules and motives) can enormously 
enhance cooperation making it almost inevitable. As a summary, in the competitive world of 
games, it pays to learn to achieve cooperation. However, it is not helpful to know too much: if 
the ranges of learning and the actual games differ too much, cooperation becomes impossible 
[18]. 
 
Learning requires a well-developed memory and complex signaling mechanisms, which are 
costly. This helps the selection process in evolution [13], since ‘high-quality’ individuals can 
afford the luxury of both the extensive memory and costly signaling [27]. However, 
cooperation is rather widespread among bacteria, where even the ‘top-quality individuals’ do 
not have the extensive memory mentioned above. Here ‘learning’ is achieved by the fast 
succession of  multiple generations. The Baldwin-effect describing the genetic (or epigenetic) 
fixation of those behavioral traits, which were benefitial for the individuals, may significantly 
promote the development of bacterial cooperation and the establishment of biofilms [28–32]. 
Genetically ‘imprinted’ aids of cooperation are also typical in higher organisms including 
humans. The emotional reward of cooperation uncovered by a special activation of the 
amygdalia region of our brains [33] may be one of the genetically stabilized mechanisms, 
which help the extraordinary level of human cooperation besides the complex cognitive 
functions, language and other determinants of human behavior. 
 
Effect of randomness (‘innovation’) on cooperation. From the data of Table S1.3 it is clear 
that a moderate amount of randomness, ‘innovation’ generally helps cooperation. Many of the 
above learning mechanisms imply sudden changes, innovations. Bacteria need a whole set of 
mutations for interspecies communication (such as quorum sensing), which adapt individual 
organisms to the needs of cooperation in biofilms or symbiotic associations. The improved 
innovation in the behavior of primates and humans during games has been well documented 
[34–36].  
 
An appropriate level of innovation rescues the spatial assembly of players from deadlocks, 
and accelerates the development of cooperation [18]. Many times noise acts in a stochastic 
resonance-like fashion, enabling cooperation even in cases, when cooperation could not 
develop in a zero-noise situation [37,38]. As a special example, the development of 
cooperation between members of a spatial array of oscillators (called synchrony) is grossly 
aided by noise [39]. Egalitarian motives also introduce innovative elements to strategy 
selection helping the development of cooperation [40]. 
 
However, innovation serves the development of cooperation best, if it remains a luxurious, 
rare event of development. Continuous ‘innovations’ make the system so noisy, that it looses 
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all the benefits of learning and spatial organization and reaches the mean-field limit of 
randomly selected agents with random strategy adoption rules (Table S1.3). 
 
Comparison and novelty of our findings. In Hawk-Dove games on modified Watts-
Strogatz-type small-world [2,9] and Barabasi-Albert-type [10] scale-free model networks we 
obtained very similar results of cooperation levels in all synchronously updated pair-wise 
comparison dynamics, proportional updating and best-takes-over strategy adoption rules to 
those of Tomassini et al. [2,3]. The success of our various ‘long-term’ strategy adoption rules 
to promote cooperation is in agreement with the success of pair-wise comparison dynamics 
and best-takes-over strategy adoption rules with accumulated payoffs on scale-free networks 
[1,3].  
 
On the contrary to Hawk-Dove games, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game defection always has 
a fitness advantage over cooperation, which makes the achievement of substantial cooperation 
levels even more difficult. In the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games on scale-free networks 
[10] we obtained very similar results of cooperation levels using synchronously updated pair-
wise comparison dynamics and best-takes-over strategy adoption rules to those of Tomassini 
et al. [3]. Similarly to the Hawk-Dove game with the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game our 
results with various ‘long-term’ strategy adoption rules on scale-free networks are in 
agreement with those of pair-wise comparison dynamics and best-takes-over strategy 
adoption rules using accumulated payoffs [1,3].  
 
We have to note that the definition of pair-wise comparison dynamics strategy adoption rule 
was slightly different here, than in previous papers, and on the contrary to the non-averaged 
payoffs used previously, we used average payoffs [1–3], which allows only a rough 
comparison of these results to those obtained before, and resulted in a lower level of 
cooperation than that of e.g. ref. [1]. The reason we used average payoff was that this made 
the final level of cooperators more stable at scale-free networks even after the first 5,000 
rounds of the play (data not shown). When we used non-averaged payoffs in the extended 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with 100,000 rounds of play, we re-gained the cooperation levels 
of ref. [1] at scale-free networks (m=4, data not shown). The additional papers on the subject 
used differently designed small-world networks or different strategy adoption rules, and 
therefore can not be directly compared with the current data. It is worth to mention that none 
of the previous papers describing multi-agent games on various networks [1–3] used the 
canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which was used obtaining our data in the main text, and 
which gives the most stringent condition for the development of cooperation. 
 
As a summary, our work significantly extended earlier findings, and showed that the 
introduction of learning and innovation to game strategy adoption rules helps the 
development of cooperation of agents situated in a large variety of network topologies. 
Moreover, we showed that learning and innovation help cooperation separately, but act 
synergistically, if introduced together especially in the complex form of the reinforcement 
learning, Q-learning.  
 
Interactions of learning and innovations, conclusions. Real complexity and excitement of 
games needs both learning and innovation. In Daytona-type car races skilled drivers use a 
number of reputation-building and negotiation mechanisms, and by continuously bringing 
novel innovations to their strategies, skilfully navigate between at least four types of games 
[41].  
 
Noise is usually regarded to disturb the development of cooperation. Importantly, complex 
learning strategies can actually utilize noise to drive them to a higher level of cooperation. 
Noise may act as in the well-known cases of stochastic resonance, or stochastic focusing 
(with extrinsic and intrinsic noise, respectively) enabling cooperation even in cases, when it 
could not develop without noise. In a similar fashion, mistakes increase the efficacy of 
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learning [37,38,42]. Additional noise greatly helps the optimization in the simulated 
annealing process [43–45]. 
 
Noise not only can extend the range of cooperation to regions, where the current level of 
learning would not be sufficient to achieve it, but extra learning can also ‘buffer’ an increased 
level of noise [19]. Thus, learning and innovation act side-by-side and – in gross terms – 
correct the deficiencies of the other. Learning and innovation also cooperate in the Baldwin 
effect, where beneficial innovations (in the form of mutations) are selected by the inter-
generational ‘meta-learning’ process of evolution [28–32]. Mutual learning not only makes 
innovation tolerable, but also provokes a higher level of innovation to surpass the other agent 
[36].  
 
Our work added the important point to this emerging picture that the cooperation between 
learning and innovation to achieve cooperation also works in the extension and buffering of 
those network configurations, where cooperation becomes possible. 
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Supplementary Tables 
 
Table S1.1. Effect of network topology on cooperation 
 
Network 
topology 
Effect on cooperation Games; 
strategy 
adoption 
rules 
Agents 
(players) 
References 
Lattice Sensitive to strategy 
adoption rules and 
topology (cooperation 
level is very sensitive on 
strategy adoption rules, 
high degree inhibits 
cooperation) 
HD, PDa Simulation 14, 46–48 
Lattice with 
dilution (with 
empty spaces) 
Helps (localized groups of 
cooperators emerge better) 
PD Simulation 49 
Lattice with 
hierarchical layers 
Helps (at top level, if the 
number of levels is lower 
than 4; in middle layers 
otherwise) 
PD Simulation 50, 51 
Regular random 
graphs 
Sensitive to topology 
(triangles help, loops>3 
and high degree inhibit 
cooperation) 
PD Simulation 14, 52 
Random graphs Sensitive to topology, 
long-lasting avalanches 
may develop (high degree 
inhibits cooperation) 
PD Simulation 14, 15, 53 
Small-world 
(Watts-Strogatz-
type) 
Mostly helps (helps the 
spread of cooperation + 
introduces heterogeneity to 
stabilize it, high degree 
inhibits cooperation) 
PD Simulation 14, 15, 54, 55 
Small-world 
(randomly replaced 
edges) 
Sensitive to strategy 
adoption rules (very 
sensitive to the applied 
strategy adoption rules) 
HD Simulation 2, 3 
Small-world 
(Watts-Strogatz-
type) with an 
influential node 
Destabilizes (the central 
node is very sensitive for 
attacks by defectors) 
PD Simulation 56 
Homogenous 
small-world 
(degree is kept 
identical) 
Sensitive to topology and 
temptation level (at small 
temptation helps the attack 
of defectors via shortcuts, 
helps at high temptation) 
PD Simulation 54, 55 
Scale-free 
(Barabasi-Albert-
type) 
Sensitive to to strategy 
adoption rules (hubs 
stabilize cooperation but 
make it vulnerable to 
targeted attacks, clusters 
and loops help, sensitive to 
strategy adoption rules, 
high degree inhibits 
cooperation) 
HD, PD; 
pair-wise 
comparison 
dynamics, 
imitation of 
the best  
Simulation 1, 3, 14–16, 57–59 
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Table S1.1. Effect of network topology on cooperation (continued) 
 
 
Network 
topology 
Effect on 
cooperation 
Games; strategy 
adoption rules 
Agents 
(players) 
References 
Scale-free with 
hierarchy (Ravasz-
Barabasi-type 
hierarchy) 
Inhibits (makes it 
very sensitive for 
the attack of 
defectors) 
PD Simulation 50 
Scale-free with 
communities 
Helps (isolated 
communities help 
intra-community 
cooperation) 
PD Simulation 16 
Real world 
networks 
Generally helps 
(small-worlds and 
hierarchy help 
cooperation) 
PD Internet 
communities, 
emails, karate club 
60 
Dynamic (evolves 
during the game) 
Generally helps (a 
small-world and 
hierarchy develops, 
which stabilizes 
cooperation, a 
slower reaction to 
new information is 
beneficial) 
PD Simulation 17, 21–26 
aHD = Hawk-Dove (Snowdrift, Chicken) game;  PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma game (please note that in this 
supplementary table we did not discriminate between conventional and cellular automata-type games, where in the 
latter simulating evolution agents ‘die’, and are occasionally replaced; in our simulations we used only 
‘conventional’ games, where agent-replacement was not allowed). 
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Table S1.2. Effect of learning on cooperation 
 
Type of 
learninga 
Effect on 
cooperation 
Networks; 
games; strategy 
adoption rules 
Agents 
(players) 
References 
One-step learning 
strategy adoption 
rules 
Help (increases 
cooperation in repeated 
multi-agent games) 
Lattice; PDb; Tit-
for-tat strategy 
adoption rule and 
its generous 
versionsc 
Simulation 61–63 
Two-step learning 
strategy adoption 
rulesd 
Help (make cooperation 
rather resistant to noise 
Æ often win against Tit-
for-tat) 
Lattice; PD; 
Pavlov strategy 
adoption rule and 
its generous 
versionsc 
Simulation 61–66 
Extended learning 
strategy adoption 
rules (3 or more 
steps) 
Help (each additional 
memory unit contributes 
less to the increase of 
cooperation) 
Lattice, scale-free; 
HDb, PD, 
alternating PD 
with noise; higher 
memory ‘Firm 
Pavlov’, ‘Meta-
Pavlov’ strategy 
adoption rules 
Simulation 32, 62, 67–71 
Complex learning 
strategy adoption 
rules (adaptive 
learning, operant 
conditioning, 
preferential 
learning, Q-
learning, 
reinforcement 
learning) 
Help (are not only 
resistant to noise but can 
exploit noise to drift 
towards cooperation, 
reinforcement learning 
based on local or global 
information enables 
sophisticated strategy 
adoption rules to 
emerge and allows 
efficient network 
formation) 
Lattice, scale-free; 
HD, matching 
pennies game, PD; 
pair-wise 
comparison 
dynamics strategy 
adoption rule 
Simulation, 
primates, 
humans 
12, 36, 37, 46, 72–
77 
Natural learning 
processes 
Help (fishes, monkeys 
remember their 
cooperators; birds learn 
cooperation with 
feedback signals or 
accumulated payoffs; 
lions learn cooperative 
hunting to capture fast 
prey; vampire bats share 
blood by regurgitation; 
students are more 
successful using 
complex Pavlov strategy 
adoption rules than tit-
for-tat, which is the 
default, if their memory 
capacity is 
compromised 
disfavoring cooperation; 
subjects with 
psychopathy disorders 
have a deficit of 
emotional reward for 
cooperation, which can 
be corrected by 
learning) 
PD (interfering 
Memory game) 
Guppies, birds, 
vampire bats, 
lions, monkeys, 
humans 
(controls, 
subjects with 
psychopathy, 
autism, or 
attention-deficit 
hyperactivity 
disorder) 
33, 78–86 
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Table S1.2. Effect of learning on cooperation (continued) 
 
Type of 
learninga 
Effect on 
cooperation 
Networks; 
games; strategy 
adoption rules 
Agents 
(players) 
References 
Communication, 
negotiation 
Help (viruses lack 
communication and 
cooperation; quorum 
sensing is required for 
bacterial biofilm 
formation; avoidance of 
discussion blocks 
cooperation; complex 
communication allows 
better cooperation; 
feedback eases internet 
and traffic congestion; 
firm’s market image 
helps cooperative 
response; description of 
future goals greatly 
enhances cooperation) 
PD, ‘game of 
sexes’, biofilm 
formation, internet 
usage, car-race, 
trade 
Simulation, 
viruses, bacteria, 
humans, firms 
41, 72, 73, 87–94 
Quantum 
entanglement 
(‘quantum 
communication’) 
Helps (quantum bits, 
‘qubits’ enable a 
continuous cooperation, 
which works as a 
contract) 
Quantum minority 
game, quantum PD 
Simulation 95 
Tag, reputation-
building 
Help (establishing and 
learning tags and 
reputation help 
cooperators to detect 
each other – even 
without memory – and 
build communities) 
Donation game, 
PD, ultimatum 
game, car-race, e-
trade 
Simulation, 
humans 
19, 27, 41, 67, 96–
98 
Evolutionary 
preserved 
recognition (using 
the Baldwin-effect) 
Helps (enables the 
detection and avoidance 
of cheaters; the learned 
habbit is selected and 
fixed by evolution) 
Hermaphrodites 
exchanging eggs 
Hermaphrodite 
worms 
99 
Memory of 
cooperation 
patterns (cultural 
context) 
Helps (cooperation in 
previous games; 
cooperative educational 
or cultural traits) 
Intergenerational 
public good game, 
PD, ultimatum 
game 
Humans 12, 27, 100, 101 
aThe term ‘learning’ is used here in the sense of the collection and use of information influencing game strategy 
adoption rules and behavior, and not in the restricted sense of imitation, or directed information-flow from a 
dominant source (the teacher). Therefore, learning here includes communication, negotiation, memory, label-
assignment and label-recognition, etc. 
bHD = Hawk-Dove (Snowdrift, Chicken) game;  PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma game (please note that in this 
supplementary table we did not discriminate between conventional and cellular automata-type games, where in the 
latter simulating evolution agents ‘die’, and are occasionally replaced; in our simulations we used only 
‘conventional’ games, where agent-replacement was not allowed). 
cTit-for-tat = this strategy adoption rule copies the opponent’s step in the previous round; Pavlov = a ‘win stay – 
lose shift’ strategy adoption rule; generous strategy adoption rules = allow ‘extra’ cooperation options with a given 
probability. 
dThese strategy adoption rules are interchangeably called as ‘memory-one’ or ‘memory-two’ strategy adoption 
rules referring to the fact that e.g. in the Pavlov strategy adoption rule agents remember the outcome of only the 
last step (‘memory-one’) but that of both players (‘memory-two’). 
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Table S1.3. Effect of innovation on cooperation 
 
Type of 
innovationa 
Effect on 
cooperation 
Networks; 
games; strategy 
adoption rules 
Agents 
(players) 
References 
Topological 
irregularities 
(empty sites = 
‘sterile defectors’, 
small-world 
shortcuts, hubs) 
Mostly help (see Table 
1, block the spread of 
defection, however high 
degree inhibits 
cooperation and 
irregularities make it 
sensitive for strategy 
adoption rules) 
Lattice, small-
world; HD, PDb  
Simulation 49, 102 and Table 
S1.1 
Low noise (random 
noise, errors, 
mistakes, the 
‘trembling hand’) 
Helps (at low levels 
resolves deadlocks, at 
high levels inhibits 
cooperation) 
Evolutionary 
language learning 
game, ultimatum 
game 
Simulation 42, 98 
High noise (random 
noise, errors, 
mistakes, the 
‘trembling hand’) 
Inhibits (PD game is 
noise-sensitive, 
especially on lattices, 
where noise makes 
cooperator boundaries 
irregular) 
Lattice; PD Simulation 52, 102–104 
Pink noise (chaotic 
changes in 
environment 
affecting payoff) 
Mostly helps (smaller, 
but reliable payoffs 
become more attractive) 
Lattice; PD Simulation 105 
Random elements 
in strategy 
adoption rules 
(strategy selection, 
payoff 
determination, etc.) 
Help (at low levels 
resolve deadlocks, at 
high levels inhibit 
cooperation)  
Lattice, random, 
small-world; HD, 
PD 
Simulation 48, 50, 55, 106, 107 
Random extra 
cooperation in 
strategy adoption 
rules 
Helps Lattice; PD; 
Generous tit-for-tat, 
‘double-generous-
tit-for-tat’ 
Simulation 65, 108 
Mutation of 
strategy adoption 
rules 
Helps (may re-introduce 
cooperation)  
Lattice; PD Simulation 66 
Extra loner 
strategy adoption 
rulec 
Helps (even for large 
temptation values) 
Lattice, small-
world; PD, public 
good game 
Simulation 107, 109–112 
Quantum 
probabilistic 
strategies 
Help (ancillary quantum 
bits, ‘qubits’ enable to 
use ‘mixed’ strategies) 
Quantum minority 
game, quantum PD 
Simulation 95 
Random elements 
in strategy 
adoption rules 
Help (increased when 
playing games)  
matching pennies 
game, PD and other 
social dilemma 
games 
Simulation, 
humans, 
primates 
34–37, 113 
Mixed strategies Help (reputation 
building is 
supplemented with 
costly punishment)  
PD Humans 114 
Egalitarian 
motives 
Help (help the 
development of 
reciprocity)  
Public good game Humans 40 
aThe term ‘innovation’ is used here in the sense of irregularities in the process of the game. Therefore, innovation 
here includes errors, mutations, mistakes, noise, randomness and increased temperature besides the senso stricto 
innovation of conscious, intelligent agents. 
bHD = Hawk-Dove (Snowdrift, Chicken) game; PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma game (please note that in this 
supplementary table we did not discriminate between conventional and cellular automata-type games, where in the 
latter simulating evolution agents ‘die’, and are occasionally replaced; in our simulations we used only 
‘conventional’ games, where agent-replacement was not allowed).  
cLoners do not participate in the game and share the income with the co-player. 
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Figure S1.1. Variation of cooperation level using short-term, non-innovative strategy adoption rules in 
Hawk-Dove games on small-world and scale-free networks. The modified Watts-Strogatz small-world 
networks (Panels A, C and E) were built on a 50 x 50 lattice, where each node was connected to its 
eight nearest neighbors. The rewiring probability of the regular links was 0 (pale blue triangles), 0.05 
(green circles), 0.1 (red squares) and 1 (dark blue diamonds). The Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks 
(Panels B, D and F) also contained 2,500 nodes, where at each construction step a new node was added 
with m=1 (pale blue triangles), m=3 (green circles), m=5 (red squares) or m=7 (dark blue diamonds) 
new links attached to the existing nodes. For the description of the networks, Hawk-Dove games and 
the three different strategy adoption rules, the pair-wise comparison dynamics (Panels A and B), the 
proportional updating (Panels C and D) and the best-takes-over strategy adoption rules (Panels E and 
F), see Methods. For each strategy adoption rule and G values (representing the gain of hawk meeting a 
dove, see Methods), 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed. 
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Figure S1.2. Q-learning improves and stabilizes the cooperation of agents forming small-
world and scale-free networks in Hawk-Dove games. A, The modified Watts-Strogatz small-
world networks [2] were built on a 50 x 50 lattice, where each node was connected to its eight 
nearest neighbors. The rewiring probability of the regular links was 0.05. B, The Barabasi-
Albert scale-free networks [10] also contained 2,500 nodes, where at each construction step a 
new node was added with m=3 new links attached to the existing nodes. For the description of 
the Hawk-Dove games and the four different strategy adoption rules, pair-wise comparison 
dynamics (pale blue triangles), proportional updating (green circles), best-takes-over (red 
squares) and Q-learning (dark blue diamonds) see Methods. C, The rewiring probability of the 
small-world network of panel A was 0 (regular network, pale blue triangles), 0.05 (small-
world, green circles), 0.1 (small-world, red rectangles) and 1 (random network, dark blue 
diamonds). D, The number of nodes added to the existing nodes of the scale-free network of 
B was varied between 1 and 7. For each strategy adoption rule and G values (representing the 
gain of hawk meeting a dove, see Methods), 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were 
executed. 
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Figure S1.3. Long-term learning strategy adoption rules help cooperation in Hawk-Dove 
games played on various networks. For the description of the small-world [2] and scale-free 
[10] networks, the Hawk-Dove game and the different strategy adoption rules, pair-wise 
comparison dynamics (pale blue open triangles and dashed line), proportional updating (green 
open circles and dashed line), best-takes-over (red open squares and dashed line), Q-learning 
(dark blue diamonds and solid line) pair-wise comparison dynamics long (pale blue filled 
triangles and solid line), proportional updating long (green filled circles and solid line) and 
best-takes-over long (red filled squares and solid line) strategy adoption rules see Methods. A,  
Long-term learning strategy adoption rules on small-world networks with a rewiring 
probability of 0.05. B,  Long-term learning strategy adoption rules on scale-free networks 
with m=3. For each game strategy adoption rule and G values (representing the gain of hawk 
meeting a dove, see Methods), 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed.  
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Figure S1.4. Long-term learning strategy adoption rules help cooperation in Hawk-Dove 
games played on modular networks. In the modular networks described by Girvan and 
Newman [11] each network had a scale-free degree distribution, contained 128 nodes and was 
divided into 4 communities. The average degree was 16. Panels A through D show the % of 
cooperation when playing on Girvan-Newman modular networks with levels 1, 5, 10 or 16, 
respectively, where ‘level 1’ means that for each node in the network, the expected number of 
links between a node and the nodes which are in other communities was 1. With increasing 
‘level’ the community structure died down gradually. For the description of the Hawk-Dove 
game and the different strategy adoption rules, pair-wise comparison dynamics (pale blue 
open triangles and dashed line), proportional updating (green open circles and dashed line), 
best-takes-over (red open squares and dashed line), Q-learning (dark blue filled diamonds and 
solid line) pair-wise comparison dynamics long (pale blue filled triangles and solid line), 
proportional updating long (green filled circles and solid line) and best-takes-over long (red 
filled squares and solid line) strategy adoption rules see Methods. For each game strategy 
adoption rule and G values runs on 100 Girvan-Newman-type modular networks of 5,000 
time steps were executed. 
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Figure S1.5. Long-term learning strategy adoption rules help cooperation in Hawk-Dove 
games on randomly mixed population and on repeatedly re-randomized networks. For the 
description of the Hawk-Dove game and the different strategy adoption rules, pair-wise 
comparison dynamics (pale blue open triangles and dashed line), proportional updating (green 
open circles and dashed line), best-takes-over (red open squares and dashed line), Q-learning 
(dark blue filled diamonds and solid line) pair-wise comparison dynamics long (pale blue 
filled triangles and solid line), proportional updating long (green filled circles and solid line) 
and best-takes-over long (red filled squares and solid line) strategy adoption rules see 
Methods. A, Games between two randomly selected agents from 100 total. For each game 
strategy adoption rule and G values, 100 random runs of 100,000 time steps were executed. B, 
Before each individual rounds of the repeated Hawk-Dove game, we generated a new random 
graph of the agents with a connection probability, p=0.02, where the number of agents was 
200. In this way for a specific agent, its neighbors changed in each round of game. For each 
game strategy adoption rule and G values (representing the gain of hawk meeting a dove, see 
Methods), 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed. 
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Figure S1.6. Long-term learning strategy adoption rules help cooperation in both canonical 
and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games played on small-world and scale-free networks. The 
small-world (panels A  and C, [2]) and scale-free (panels B and D, [10]) networks were built 
as described in the Methods. For the description of the Prisoner’s Dilemma games and the 
different strategy adoption rules, pair-wise comparison dynamics (pale blue open triangles 
and dashed line), proportional updating (green open circles and dashed line), best-takes-over 
(red open squares and dashed line), Q-learning (dark blue filled diamonds and solid line) pair-
wise comparison dynamics long (pale blue filled triangles and solid line), proportional 
updating long (green filled circles and solid line) and best-takes-over long (red filled squares 
and solid line) strategy adoption rules see Methods. Panels A and B, extended Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games ( 0,0,1 === SPR  T was changed from 1 to 2; 1). Panels C and D, 
canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games ( 0,1,3 === SPR  T was changed from 3 to 6; [6]). In 
the canonical Prisoner’s Dilemma games when using the Q-learning, the initial annealing 
temperature was set to 10,000 to extend the annealing process [115]). For each game strategy 
adoption rule and T values 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed. 
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Figure S1.7. Comparison of innovative strategy adoption rules in Hawk-Dove games on 
small-world and scale-free networks. The small-world (A and C blue symbols and dashed 
lines) and scale-free (B and C red symbols and solid lines) networks were built as described in 
Methods. For the description of the Hawk-Dove game and the different strategy adoption 
rules, pair-wise comparison dynamics (pale blue filled squares, solid line), pair-wise 
comparison dynamics long (pale blue filled triangles, solid line), pair-wise comparison 
dynamics long innovative (pale blue filled circles, solid line), proportional updating (green 
filled squares, dashed line), proportional updating long (green filled triangles, dashed line), 
proportional updating long innovative (green filled circles, dashed line), best-takes-over (on 
panel A and B: red filled squares, on panel C: filled circles), best-takes-over long (on panel A 
and B: red filled triangles, on panel C: open circles), best-takes-over innovative (on panel C: 
filled squares), best-takes-over long innovative (on panel A and B: red filled circles, on panel 
C: open squares), and Q-learning (blue filled diamonds) strategy adoption rules, see Methods. 
For each game strategy adoption rule and G values (representing the gain of hawk meeting a 
dove, see Methods), 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed. 
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Figure S1.8. Comparison of different innovation levels of the best-takes-over long innovative 
strategy adoption rule in Hawk-Dove and extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games on small-
world and scale-free networks. The small-world (panels A and B, [2]) and scale-free (panels C 
and D, [10]) networks were built as described in the Methods. For the description of the 
Hawk-Dove game (panels A and C), extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game (panels B and D) and 
the best-takes-over long innovative strategy adoption rule, see Methods. The probability of 
innovation was changed from zero to 0.1 as described in the Figure legend. For each game 
strategy adoption rule and G values (representing the gain of hawk meeting a dove, see 
Methods), 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed. 
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Figure S1.9. Long-term learning and innovative strategy adoption rules extend cooperative 
network topologies in the Hawk-Dove game. The top middle panel shows the level of 
cooperation at different network topologies. small-world (spheres) and scale-free (cones) 
networks were built as described in the Methods. The rewiring probability, p of small-world 
networks was increased from 0 to 1 with 0.05 increments, the number of edges linking each 
new node to former nodes in scale-free networks was varied from 1 to 7, and the means of 
shortest path-lengths and clustering coefficients were calculated for each network. Cubes and 
cylinders denote regular (p = 0) and random (p = 1.0) extremes of the small-world networks, 
respectively. For the description of the games and the best-takes-over (green symbols); long-
term learning best-takes-over (blue symbols); long-term learning innovative best-takes-over 
(magenta symbols) and Q-learning (red symbols) strategy adoption rules used, see Methods. 
The left and right panels show the 2D side views of the 3D top middle panel using the same 
symbol-set. For each network 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were executed at a fixed G 
value of 0.8. The bottom middle panel shows a color-coded illustration of the various network 
topologies used on the top middle panel. Here the same simulations are shown as on the top 
middle panel with a different color-code emphasizing the different network topologies. The 
various networks are represented by the following colors: regular networks – blue; small-
world networks – green; scale-free networks – yellow; random networks – red (from the angle 
of the figure the random networks are behind some of the small-world networks and, 
therefore are highlighted with a red arrow to make there identification easier). 
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Figure S1.10. Long-term learning and innovative strategy adoption rules extend cooperative 
network topologies in the extended Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The top middle panel shows 
the level of cooperation at different network topologies. small-world (spheres) and scale-free 
(cones) networks were built as described in the Methods. The rewiring probability, p of small-
world networks was increased from 0 to 1 with 0.05 increments, the number of edges linking 
each new node to former nodes in scale-free networks was varied from 1 to 7, and the means 
of shortest path-lengths and clustering coefficients were calculated for each network. Cubes 
and cylinders denote regular (p = 0) and random (p = 1.0) extremes of the small-world 
networks, respectively. For the description of the games and the best-takes-over (green 
symbols); long-term learning best-takes-over (blue symbols); long-term learning innovative 
best-takes-over (magenta symbols) and Q-learning (red symbols) strategy adoption rules used, 
see Methods. The left and right panels show the 2D side views of the 3D top middle panel 
using the same symbol-set. For each network 100 random runs of 5,000 time steps were 
executed at a fixed T value of 1.8. The bottom middle panel shows a color-coded illustration 
of the various network topologies used on the top middle panel. Here the same simulations 
are shown as on the top middle panel with a different color-code emphasizing the different 
network topologies. The various networks are represented by the following colors: regular 
networks – blue; small-world networks – green; scale-free networks – yellow; random 
networks – red (from the angle of the figure the random networks are behind some of the 
small-world networks and, therefore are highlighted with a red arrow to make there 
identification easier).  
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Figure S1.11. Both hawks and doves become isolated in extreme minority, when they use the 
innovative Q-learning strategy adoption rule in Hawk-Dove games on small-world and scale-
free networks. The small-world [2] and scale-free networks [10] were built, and Hawk-Dove 
games were played as described in the Methods using 225 agents. Networks showing the last 
round of 5,000 plays were visualized using the Kamada-Kawai algorithm of the Pajek 
program [116]. Blue and orange dots correspond to hawks and doves, respectively. Green, 
orange and grey lines denote hawk-hawk, dove-dove or dove-hawk contacts, respectively. 
Arrows point to lonely hawks or doves using the respective colors above. A,  Small-world 
network with a rewiring probability of 0.05, G=0.15. B,  Small-world network with a rewiring 
probability of 0.05, G=0.95. C,  Scale-free network with m=3, G=0.1. D,  Scale-free network 
with m=3, G=0.98. We have received similar data when playing extended Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games (data not shown). 
A B
C D
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Figure S1.12. Hawks, and especially doves are not extremely isolated in extreme minority, 
when they use the non-innovative best-takes-over strategy adoption rule in Hawk-Dove 
games on small-world and scale-free networks. The small-world [2] and scale-free networks 
[10] were built, and Hawk-Dove games were played as described in the Methods using 225 
agents. Networks showing the last round of 5,000 plays were visualized using the Kamada-
Kawai algorithm of the Pajek program [116]. Blue and orange dots correspond to hawks and 
doves, respectively. Green, orange and grey lines denote hawk-hawk, dove-dove or dove-
hawk contacts, respectively. Arrows point to lonely hawks or doves using the respective 
colours above. A,  Small-world network with a rewiring probability of 0.05, G=0.15. B,  
Small-world network with a rewiring probability of 0.05, G=0.75. C,  Scale-free network with 
m=3, G=0.1. D,  Scale-free network with m=3, G=0.8. We have received similar data using 
other non-innovative strategy adoption rules, such as pair-wise comparison dynamics, or 
proportional updating, as well as when playing extended Prisoner’s Dilemma games (data not 
shown). 
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